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DLD-244        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1872 
___________ 
 
LINWOOD WILKERSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons;  
 SMOKER, Correctional Officer, LSCI-Allenwood; 
 SOLOMAN, Factory Manager, LSCI-Allenwood 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil No. 3-12-cv-01462) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 18, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Linwood Wilkerson (“Wilkerson”), an inmate at FCI-Allenwood 
Medium, appeals the District Court’s order granting Correctional Officer R. Smoker’s 
motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of Smoker against Wilkerson, 
and closing the case.1  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Wilkerson filed a pro se complaint in the District Court alleging violations of his 
civil rights.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971).  We have previously described Wilkerson’s retaliation allegations against 
defendant Smoker as follows: 
Wilkerson alleged that Appellee Smoker, a supervisor in the UNICOR 
factory in which Wilkerson worked at the Low Security Correctional 
Institution Allenwood (“LSCI Allenwood”), verbally harassed him.  In 
response, Wilkerson filed a hostile work environment complaint with 
prison officials.  He maintained that the complaint was ignored and that 
Smoker retaliated by filing a false incident report against him, resulting in 
disciplinary proceedings; Wilkerson was found guilty of the incident and 
lost his UNICOR job for six months.  He also alleged that he was 
transferred to a higher custody institution as a result of the disciplinary 
proceedings. 
                                              
1 The Court also dismissed the other defendants, but on appeal Wilkerson states that he 
has abandoned any appellate issue concerning their personal involvement, and 
accordingly pursues this appeal against only Defendant Smoker.  We confine our 
discussion to the claims against Smoker. 
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Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App’x 776, 777 (3d Cir. 2013).2  The key underlying (and 
undisputed) facts concerning the incident report that Smoker filed are that, while working 
at the prison factory, Wilkerson left a wood chisel behind in his tool box after Wilkerson 
was called out for a visit, but that Wilkerson then reported to prison staff that he had 
returned all of his tools, as prison regulations require.  Wilkerson’s explanation is that he 
left the wood chisel inadvertently and thus did not know it remained behind. 
   After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Wilkerson had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, had failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to establish a retaliation claim, and that defendants had qualified immunity.  
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion on multiple alternative grounds, and 
Wilkerson timely appealed. 
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s entry of summary judgment, viewing the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Wilkerson.  See Ray v. 
Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010).  Summary judgment is appropriate if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may affirm on any basis that the record 
supports.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
                                              
2 In that prior opinion, we affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded on the ground 
that the District Court had erred in concluding that Wilkerson’s retaliation claim was 
time-barred and was prohibited under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).   
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 The District Court did not err in entering judgment against Wilkerson on his 
claims against Smoker because the record facts show that Wilkerson could not establish 
his retaliation claim.  To sustain a retaliation claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) 
he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered adverse action; and (3) 
the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the 
adverse response.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002); Rauser 
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  With respect to causation, if the prisoner 
makes a prima facie showing that his constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating 
factor in the decision to discipline, the defendant then has the burden of showing that the 
same disciplinary action would have been taken even in the absence of the protected 
activity.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. 
 Here, the record shows that there is no disputable issue that Wilkerson would have 
received the same disciplinary consequences irrespective of his constitutionally protected 
activity.  Wilkerson admits that he left a wood chisel (albeit, he says, inadvertently) in his 
tool box in contravention of prison regulations, and he admits that he told the prison staff 
that he had returned all of his tools when, in fact, he had not.  That evidence of 
Wilkerson’s guilt shows that Smoker’s actions in reporting Wilkerson were reasonably 
related to a legitimate penological interest in securing potential weapons and escape aids 
and that—especially given that there were other witnesses to Wilkerson’s failure to return 
his work tools—Wilkerson would have been charged regardless of his earlier grievance 
filings about Smoker.  See, e.g., Carter, 292 F.3d at 159 (affirming summary judgment in 
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favor of defendants on a retaliation claim when “the quantum of evidence” concerning 
the prisoner’s misconduct showed that he would face disciplinary action regardless of his 
protected activity).  As a result, Wilkerson cannot establish a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether retaliation caused the adverse consequences he suffered, and the 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Smoker on this claim.3 
 For these reasons, this appeal presents no substantial question and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
                                              
3 Because Wilkerson’s inability to establish causation disposes of his claim, we need not 
discuss the District Court’s other reasons for granting summary judgment in Smoker’s 
favor. 
